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Crown Ownership of Water in situ 
in Common Law Canada : Public Trusts, 
Classical Trusts and Fiduciary Duties*
Jane MattHews Glenn**
A clear understanding of the private law rules relating to water in situ 
is a necessary pre-condition to the success of any public law management 
regime. This article thus examines the private law rules applicable in the 
common law provinces to determine if there are functional equivalents to 
Québec’s private law principle of res communis and its statutory notion 
of State “custodianship”.
It concludes that while there is no direct functional equivalent to the 
concept of res communis, there is an acceptance — almost by default — of 
Crown ownership of water in situ, an acceptance reflected in the legisla-
tion of the western provinces. However, this Crown ownership is not full 
and absolute but rather limited, more in the nature of “custodianship” 
than “ownership”. This conclusion follows an exploration of three equi-
table institutions — the public trust, the classical trust and fiduciary duties. 
In each case, the argument for limitation is difficult, but not impossible, 
to make.
Les Cahiers de Droit, vol. 51, nos 3-4, septembre-décembre 2010, p. 493-519 
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 * My interest in this topic owes much to the influence of a McGill colleague, Madeleine 
Cantin CuMyn, whose writings on Québec’s private law of water have enticed me to 
reflect on the common law’s approach to water in situ. Earlier versions were presented 
first at a Rendez-vous international sur la gestion intégrée de l’eau, Université de Sher-
brooke, June 2009 (“La nature juridique de l’eau au Canada : A res communis in civil 
law and common law”, presented jointly with Madeleine Cantin CuMyn) and more 
recently at a conference on Private Property, Planning and the Public Interest, Univer-
sity of Windsor, March 2010 (“Ownership of Water in Situ in Common Law Canada : 
Reflections on res communis”).
** Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Law and School of Urban Planning ; Associate Member, 
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Une compréhension appropriée des règles de droit privé portant sur 
l’eau in situ est un préalable nécessaire au succès de tout régime public de 
gestion de l’eau. L’article qui suit examine les règles de droit privé appli-
cables dans les provinces de common law pour déterminer dans quelle 
mesure il y existe des équivalents fonctionnels à la res communis, principe 
de droit privé auquel l’eau est assujettie, ainsi qu’à la notion statutaire 
de l’État comme « gardien des intérêts de la nation » en droit québécois.
L’auteure conclut qu’il n’y a pas d’équivalent fonctionnel direct 
au concept de res communis mais plutôt une acceptation — presque par 
défaut — du fait que la Couronne est propriétaire de l’eau in situ, accepta-
tion qui se retrouve d’ailleurs dans la législation des provinces de l’Ouest. 
Cependant, la propriété de la Couronne n’est pas pleine et absolue mais 
plutôt limitée, avec des pouvoirs s’assimilant davantage à ceux du gardien 
qu’à ceux du propriétaire. Cette conclusion découle de l’exploration de 
trois institutions reconnues en équité, soit la fiducie publique, la fiducie 
classique et les devoirs fiduciaires. Pour chaque institution, l’argument 
en faveur de l’existence d’une limitation est difficile, mais non impossible, 
à soutenir.
Pages
1 Crown ownership .............................................................................................................. 496
2 Limits to Crown ownership .............................................................................................. 501
2.1 Public trusts .............................................................................................................. 501
2.2 Classical trusts ......................................................................................................... 507
2.2.1 Certainty ........................................................................................................ 507
2.2.1.1 Trusts for persons ......................................................................... 509
2.2.1.2 Trusts for purposes ....................................................................... 510
2.2.2 Constitution .................................................................................................. 511
2.3 Fiduciary duties ....................................................................................................... 513
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 518
Water is the source of life. It was the original cradle of life on earth 
and remains life’s fundamental necessity. As Québec’s recently adopted 
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legislation so aptly puts it, water is “of vital interest1”. Views of our planet 
from space are reassuring, but closer inspection puts the lie to the myth 
of abundance of water. Deserts are growing, and rivers are drying. Even 
Canada is not immune. A leading Canadian water scientist, John Sprague, 
stresses the importance of distinguishing between volume of water and 
renewable supply when evaluating water availability2 ; he notes that while 
Canada’s overall volume of water is large, its renewable supply is relatively 
limited, on par with that of the United States (6.5 percent and 6.4 percent 
of the world’s supply, respectively). Moreover, much of Canada’s renew-
able water flows north, and southern Canada — where most people live 
and work — has only 2.6 percent of the world’s renewable supply, placing 
it between India and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and far below 
the United States in relative abundance3.
The protection of water resources is thus an important issue across 
Canada, and the Québec government has taken a lead in this regard with 
the recent adoption of the Act to Affirm the Collective Nature of Water 
Resources and Provide for Increased Water Resource Protection4. As 
the title suggests, the Act takes as it starting point the private law’s posi-
tion that water is a collective resource. Section 1 of the Act affirms the 
basic civil law principle, found in article 913 of the Civil Code of Québec5, 
that water in situ (both surface and underground) is, by its nature, a res 
communis (or common thing) which is not owned by anyone but is avail-
able to all to use ; as such, it is “part of the common heritage of the Québec 
nation6”. The preamble to the Act stresses that the State, “as custodian of 
the interests of the nation in water resources”, must be vested with the 
necessary powers to protect and manage those resources “to meet the needs 
of present and future generations”.
 1. An Act to Affirm the Collective Nature of Water Resources and Provide for Increased 
Water Resource Protection, R.S.Q., c. C-6.2 (adopted as S.Q. 2009, c. 21), s. 1 [emphasis 
added].
 2. John B. spraGue, “Great Wet North ? Canada’s Myth of Water Abundance”, in Karen 
Bakker (ed.), Eau Canada. The Future of Canada’s Water, Vancouver, UBC Press, 
2007, p. 23, at page 24 : “To use a financial analogy, the water sitting in lakes and aquifers 
is comparable to a capital resource of money that can be spent only once. The rivers 
running out of the lakes would represent interest and dividends that could be used every 
year for an indefinite time.”
 3. Id., at pages 24 and 25.
 4. An Act to Affirm the Collective Nature of Water Resources and Provide for Increased 
Water Resource Protection, supra, note 1.
 5. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64.
 6. An Act to Affirm the Collective Nature of Water Resources and Provide for Increased 
Water Resource Protection, supra, note 1, s. 1.
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As in Québec, water management regimes must take into consider-
ation private law rules relating to water in situ if they are to be successful, 
and the purpose of this article is to examine the legal regime applicable 
to water in situ in the other Canadian provinces, whose private law tradi-
tions are English rather than French. Do the common law provinces have 
functional equivalents to Québec’s private law notion of res communis and 
its statutory notion of State “custodianship” ? In attempting to answer this 
question, we will look first at the question of Crown (or State) ownership 
of water in situ and then at possible limits to such Crown ownership.
1 Crown ownership
Crown ownership of water in situ is expressly recognized by statute 
in the western Canadian provinces. For example, the present Water Act 
of Alberta stipulates that “[t]he property in and the right to the diversion 
and use of all water in the Province is vested in Her Majesty in right of 
Alberta” and the Water Rights Act of Manitoba is substantially to the same 
effect7 ; the Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act goes one step further 
in recognizing that all surface and ground water “is, and is deemed always 
to have been, vested in the Crown8”. These provisions can be traced back to 
legislation adopted by the federal government in the 1890s (i.e. prior to the 
1905 creation of Saskatchewan and Alberta and enlargement of Manitoba) 
as part of its campaign to open the west to settlement. The North-West 
Irrigation Act was first adopted in 1894, but the specific reference to Crown 
ownership was added retroactively the following year as the original Act 
mentioned only the vesting of a right of use in the Crown9. The North-West 
Irrigation Act continued in force until ownership and control of public 
land and natural resources were transferred from the federal government 
to the three provinces in 193010 and the provisions of the federal Act were 
re-enacted as provincial law. As originally adopted, the Crown ownership 
provisions applied only to surface water ; they were not extended to include 
groundwater until 1959 in Manitoba, 1961 in Saskatchewan, and 1962 in 
 7. Water Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-3, s. 3 (2) [emphasis added] ; Water Rights Act, C.C.S.M., 
c. W80, s. 2.
 8. Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act, S.S. 2005, c. S-35.03, s. 38 (1) [emphasis added].
 9. North-West Irrigation Act, S.C. 1895, c. 33, s. 2, amending S.C. 1894, c. 30, s. 4.
10. Constitution Act, 1930 (U.K.), 20-21 Geo. V, c. 26, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, 
No. 26. The intention to include water in the 1930 transfer was retroactively confirmed 
in 1938 : Natural Resources Transfer (Amendment) Act 1938, S.C. 1938, c. 36, Schedule. 
See generally David R. perCy, “Responding to Water Scarcity in Western Canada”, 
(2004-2005) 83 Tex. L. Rev. 2091.
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Alberta11. As for British Columbia, although the colony had adopted legis-
lation providing for Crown control of the use of water as early as 189212, 
it did not provide for Crown ownership of surface water until 192513 and 
did not recognize it as extending to underground water until 1995 (in terms 
recalling Saskatchewan’s legislation) : “ The property in and the right to 
the use, percolation and any flow of ground water, wherever ground water 
is found in British Columbia, are for all purposes vested in the Crown in 
right of British Columbia and are conclusively deemed to have always been 
vested in the Crown in right of British Columbia 14.”
However, Crown ownership seems to have been added to the statutes 
of the western provinces for purely instrumental reasons, as a management 
tool to complement a statutory permit system of requiring government 
approval for water withdrawals over a statutory minimum15. A leading 
western Canadian water law scholar, David Percy, describes Crown owner-
ship as “a cornerstone of the legislation, in order to secure control over 
water use16”, and this seems to be reflected in the purpose sections of 
some present provincial legislation17. This suggests that statutory Crown 
11. The Department of Agriculture and Immigration Act Amendment Act, 1959, S.M. 1959 
(2nd Sess.), c. 4, s. 47 ; An Act to Amend The Water Rights Act, S.S. 1961, c. 21, s. 3 ; An 
Act to Amend The Water Resources Act, S.A. 1962, c. 99, s. 2.
12. Water Privileges Act, 1892, S.B.C. 1892, c. 47, s. 2 ; see subsequently Water Clauses 
Consolidation Act, 1897, S.B.C. 1897, c. 45, s. 4 (statute generally similar to 1894 federal 
North-West Irrigation Act, supra, note 9).
13. An Act to Amend the “Water Act”, S.B.C. 1925, c. 61, s. 3 (see now Water Act, R.S.B.C. 
1996, c. 483, s. 2 (1) ; see also Water Protection Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 484, s. 3 (1)).
14. Water Protection Act, S.B.C. 1995, c. 34, s. 3 (2) (now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 484, s. 3 (2)) 
[emphasis added] ; see Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act, supra, note 8. B.C.’s 
earliest legislative mention of Crown ownership of groundwater came in 1960, when the 
Water Act was amended to authorize the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council to extend 
Crown ownership provisions to ground water by regulation : Water Act Amendment Act, 
1960, S.B.C. 1960, c. 60, s. 4. This provision still remains in the Water Act notwithstanding 
the broad scope of s. 3 (2) of the Water Protection Act.
15. The permit system was a necessary part of the main legislative change extending water 
access to non-riparian owners in order to attract settlers to the dry prairies.
16. D.R. perCy, supra, note 10, 2094 [emphasis added] ; see also David R. perCy, “Seventy-
Five Years of Alberta Water Law : Maturity, Demise and Rebirth”, (1996-1997) 35 Alta. 
L. Rev. 221, 223 : “Having secured control of the resource [through the declaration that 
the property in and the right to the use of all water was vested in the Crown], the Crown 
then allocated the right to divert and use water to those who obtained a licence” ; Randall 
W. BloCk and Joel Forrest, “A Gathering Storm : Water Conflict in Alberta”, (2005-
2006) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 31, 33 : Crown ownership “allowed the government to establish” 
the licensing system [emphasis added].
17. E.g., the purpose of B.C.’s Water Protection Act, supra, note 14, s. 2, is “to foster 
sustainable use of British Columbia’s water resources in continuation of the objectives 
of conserving and protecting the environment” ; and the over-riding purpose of Alberta’s 
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ownership in the western provinces resembles the Québec requirement that 
the State, “as custodian of the interests of the nation in water resources”, be 
vested with the necessarypowers to preserve and manage those resources18. 
It is what one American author, writing about the public trust, labels 
“‘sovereign capacity’ ownership19”.
Nevertheless, the statutory rules in the western provinces cannot be 
considered in isolation from the private law principles that underpin them. 
And these principles also apply in the eastern common law provinces, 
where the question of ownership of water in situ is not dealt with explicitly 
by statute20.
The starting point is to recognize that the common law does not regard 
water in situ as being capable of private ownership. As Halsbury’s Laws 
of England puts it : 
Although certain rights as regards flowing water are incident to the ownership of 
riparian property, the water itself, whether flowing in a known and defined channel 
or percolating through the soil, is not, at common law, the subject of property or 
capable of being granted to anybody. Flowing water is only of public right in the 
sense that it is public or common to all who have a right of access to it21.
Water Act, supra, note 7, s. 2, is “to support and promote the conservation and manage-
ment of water, including the wise allocation and use of water” (with detailed matters to 
be taken into consideration including “the need to manage and conserve water resources 
to sustain our environment and to ensure a healthy environment and high quality of life 
in the present and the future” (s. 2 (a)) and “the need for Alberta’s economic growth 
and prosperity” (s. 2 (b)) ; the section also includes “market forces” (s. 2 (c)) as a mana-
gement tool).
18. An Act to Affirm the Collective Nature of Water Resources and Provide for Increased 
Water Resource Protection, supra, note 1, preamble.
19. Richard J. lazarus, “Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources : Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine”, (1985-1986) 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631, 
637.
20. Without having systematically surveyed the legislation of all the eastern provinces, 
a random sampling indicates that the Crown is vested with the simple “control of all 
water” in New Brunswick (Clean Water Act, S.N.B. 1989, c. C-6.1, s. 9), the Minister of 
the Environment has “supervision of all surface waters and ground waters in Ontario” 
(Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40, s. 29), and the legislation is silent 
on this issue in Nova Scotia.
21. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed. by Lord HailsHaM oF st-MaryleBone, vol. 49 (2) 
“Water”, London, LexisNexis / Butterworths, 2004, par. 47 [emphasis added]. Halsbury’s 
analysis of water rights relies heavily on 19th century English decisions, and its approach 
and sources are reflected in the short treatment of water rights in the classic English and 
Canadian property law texts (e.g. Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property, 
17th ed. by Edward H. Burn and John CartwriGHt, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2006, p. 177 ; Bruce H. ziFF, Principles of Property Law, 4th ed., Toronto, Thomson / 
Carswell, 2006, p. 97 ff.). Other authors refer more explicitly to the influence of the civil 
law on the historical development of this area of the common law – e.g. Samuel C. wiel, 
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The common law focus is thus on private rights of access to (i.e. use of) 
water, which are described as “natural rights” or “natural incidents” because 
they exist automatically as part of the normal rights associated with the 
ownership of land if its geographic situation supports it22. Briefly put, the 
common law rules of access to surface water (i.e. water flowing through a 
defined channel) try to strike a rough balance between the upstream and 
downstream riparian owners by recognizing to the lower riparian owner 
a right to the natural flow of water undiminished in quantity or quality, 
subject to “ordinary and reasonable use” by the upper riparian owner for 
purposes connected to the riparian property. On the other hand, rights of 
access to underground water (i.e. percolating water) are much more abso-
lute at common law : all landholders have the right to withdraw as much 
water as they like, for whatever purpose they wish23, without regard to the 
effect this withdrawal might have on neighbouring landholders (e.g. loss 
of water, subsidence)24.
The common law thus rejects the notion of private ownership of water 
in situ. However, it seems to accept the principle of Crown ownership (even 
absent a specific statutory provision to this effect) almost by default. The 
Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia v. Canadian Forest  Products 
Ltd. describes it as being “by legal convention25”, and most common law 
lawyers would instinctively agree. But the basis for this convention is not 
entirely clear. The Supreme Court supports its position by reference to 
“Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses in the Common 
Law and in the Civil Law”, (1917-1918) 6 Cal. L. Rev. 245 & 342 ; Joshua Getzler, A 
History of Water Rights at Common Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 1 
and 2 : “The new water doctrines were built from Roman law and Roman-derived civil-
law concepts of common goods and the natural rights of ownership, together with the 
English sources of Bracton and Blackstone, part-civilians themselves.”
22. The natural incident theory was not accepted as the foundation of riparian use rights 
until the mid-19th century : see particularly J. Getzler, supra, note 21, p. 268-327. Inter-
estingly, a leading case in the development of the common law position was a Privy 
Council decision in a case from Lower Canada, Miner v. Gilmour, (1858) 12 Moo. P.C. 
131, 14 E.R. 861 : J. Getzler, supra, note 21, p. 292-294.
23. In other words, the water does not have to be used for purposes connected with the land 
in question, nor does the use have to be reasonable.
24. The possibility of conflict is attenuated but not eliminated by the adoption of a statutory 
permit system capping the amount of water that might be withdrawn as of right. See gene-
rally Cory Hill and others, “Appendix 1 : A Survey of Water Governance Legislation 
and Policies in the Provinces and Territories”, in K. Bakker, supra, note 2, p. 369, at 
page 383 (Table A-4 “Water property rights by provincial and territorial jurisdictions”) ; 
D.R. perCy, supra, note 10.
25. British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74, par. 76 [herein-
after “Canadian Forest Products”].
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the historical influence of natural law, and quotes an extract from the 13th 
century author Henry de Bracton :
[It is the lord king] himself who has ordinary jurisdiction and power over all who 
are within his realm […] He also has, in preference to all others in his realm, privi-
leges by virtue of the jus gentium [By the jus gentium] things are his […] which 
by natural law ought to be common to all […] Those concerned with jurisdiction 
and the peace […] belong to no one save the crown alone and the royal dignity, 
nor can they be separated from the crown, since they constitute the crown26.
The things referred to by Bracton — those things which “by natural law 
ought to be common to all” — include “running water” as well as air, the 
sea and the shores of the sea27. But a leading Oxford legal historian, Joshua 
Getzler, casts doubt on the extent to which Bracton’s treatise accurately 
reflects English law of the period28, and others suggest that from Saxon 
times up to the reign of Charles I — thus, even at the time of Bracton — much 
of the foreshore of England was in fact privately owned29.
Other possible bases for the legal convention of Crown ownership 
are more instinctive than historical. One is the idea that all things must be 
owned by someone, and since water in situ is not susceptible to private 
ownership, it must be owned by the Crown : “the common law introduced 
into [the Justinian notion of the common nature of running water, the air, 
the sea and the shores of the sea] a concept less important in Roman times : 
ownership. The common law abhorred ownerless things. It was held, there-
26. Id., citing Henry de BraCton, On the Laws and Customs of England [De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliæ], edited by George E. woodBine and translated by Samuel E. 
tHorne, vol. 2, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 166 and 167 [emphasis 
added].
27. British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., supra, note 25, par. 75, citing H. 
de BraCton, supra, note 26, p. 39 and 40. Bracton’s list is itself generally recognized as 
echoing the Institutes of Justinian : e.g. J. Getzler, supra, note 21, p. 67. See also the 
discussion infra, the text at note 35.
28. J. Getzler, supra, note 21, p. 50 (the “account of the law [in De Legibus] often contra-
dicts both itself and the evidence of thirteenth-century practice”) and p. 52 (“De Legibus 
was therefore written not as an accurate handbook of legal practice, but as a scholarly 
treatise on a grand scale, resorting to Justinian for an abstract vocabulary with which 
to analyse the emergent native actions”).
29. E.g. : Frederick R. Coudert, “Riparian Rights ; A Perversion of Stare Decisis”, (1909) 9 
Colum. L. Rev. 217 ; Royal E.T. riGGs, “The Alienability of the State’s Title to the 
Foreshore”, (1912) 12 Colum. L. Rev. 395 ; Patrick deveney, “Title, Jus Publicum, and 
the Public Trust : An Historical Analysis”, (1976) 1 Sea Grant Law Journal 13, 41 ff ; 
R.J. lazarus, supra, note 19, 635. They attribute the present position of a rebuttable 
presumption of Crown ownership to the influence of a 1569 pamphlet, Proofs of the 
Queen’s Interest in Lands left by the Sea and the Salt Shores thereof, written by a 
Thomas Digges, who was a lawyer and advisor of Elizabeth I (and, it is said by some, a 
would-be land speculator).
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fore, that the ownership of beds of navigable waters was in the King30.” 
This conclusion is reinforced by a second instinctive notion grounded in 
the historical feudal underpinning of the common law of property which 
regards the Crown as ultimate owner of all real property, granted as well 
as ungranted. This was said to be the basis for Crown ownership of the 
foreshore : “the King […] in addition to this merely public function [safe-
guarding public rights of navigation and fishing] he possessed in his own 
right, as the general residuary owner of all the soil in England, the jus 
privatum, or title to the soil of the foreshore, which conferred upon him the 
right either to alienate or to use this property in any way not incompatible 
with the jus publicum31”.
This analysis leads to a conclusion of State ownership (express or 
implied) of water in situ in the common law provinces. But what sort of 
ownership is it ? Is it full and absolute ownership entitling the Crown to 
do what it wants with the water ? Or is it ownership subject to some sort 
of limitation or restriction, and thus close to the notion of custodianship 
under Québec’s new water law ? 
2 Limits to Crown ownership 
Because of the fundamental importance of water to life, it is inconceiv-
able that Crown ownership of water in situ is full and absolute, giving the 
Crown the right to do with the water whatever it wants. Rather, it must be 
limited ownership, with the limitations arguably coming from the principles 
governing trusts, especially the elusive American-style public trust, and 
those governing fiduciary relationships in general.
2.1 Public trusts 
Canadian lawyers are much attracted to the public trust as a vehicle 
to redress environmental harms. However, a concise definition of it is 
hard to find as it seems to be, as one author puts it, “chameleon-like, its 
character depending on the context of the dispute at hand32”. At its most 
basic, it represents the idea that the government holds some of its natural 
30. Jan S. stevens, “The Public Trust : A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the 
People’s Environmental Right”, (1980-1981) 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195, 197 and 198 
[emphasis added]. See also e.g. Scott kidd, “Keeping Public Resources in Public Hands : 
Advancing the Public Trust Doctrine in Canada”, (2006) 16 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 187, 191.
31. F.R. Coudert, supra, note 29, 223 [emphasis added]. Much of the historical discussion 
of Crown ownership focuses on ownership of the foreshore.
32. Michael C. BluMM, “Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law : 
A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine”, (1988-1989) 19 Envtl. L. 573, 579.
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resources — notably those “for which substitutes cannot be made by 
man” — in trust for the public33. The public trust applied traditionally to 
Crown ownership of the beds of navigable waterways and the foreshore, 
which the doctrine held could not be dealt with in a way detrimental to their 
public use for purposes of commerce, navigation and fishing. It has been 
extended more recently to encompass other resources, including surface 
and groundwater34 as well as public lands, municipal infrastructure, archae-
ological remains, cemeteries, wildlife and so on35.
The public trust doctrine is said to be derived from Roman law as 
set out in the Institutes of Justinian which, as we have seen, provides for 
common ownership of some resources (“And indeed, all of these things are 
by natural law common to all : air, flowing water, the sea and, consequently, 
the shores of the sea36”), and to have made its way from Roman law into 
the English common law in near-identical terms through the writings of 
Bracton37. The concept of a public trust first appeared in American cases 
in the early 19th century38, and was given modern impetus by the publica-
33. Bernard S. CoHen, “The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine and the Environment”, 
[1970] Utah L. Rev. 388, 388. See also David takaCs, “The Public Trust Doctrine, Envi-
ronmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property”, (2008) 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. 
L.J. 711, 713.
34. See generally Ralph W. JoHnson, “Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine”, 
(1988-1989) 19 Envtl. L. 485. See also : Charles F. wilkinson, “The Headwaters of the 
Public Trust : Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine”, 
(1988-1989) 19 Envtl. L. 425, 466 (distribution of potable water) ; J.S. stevens, supra, 
note 30, 224 (allocation of water permits).
35. E.g. R.J. lazarus, supra, note 19, 640, 641, 649 and 650 ; D. takaCs, supra, note 33, 
718-720.
36. P. deveney, supra, note 29, 23, translating the Institutes of Justinian, Inst. 2.1.1. Deveney 
argues at pages 26-28 that the Roman reference to “things common to all” originated with 
Marcian, a 3rd century jurist influenced by the idea of a primal Golden Age when the 
fruits of the earth were common to all, coupled with the Stoic notion of a moral duty 
not to deprive others of necessary things, particularly the earth’s “elements” ; see also 
e.g. D. takaCs, supra, note 33, 718 [emphasis added] : identifying public trust doctrine’s 
power as coming from longstanding idea that “some parts of the natural world are gifts 
of nature so essential to human life that private interests cannot usurp them, and so the 
sovereign must steward them to prevent such capture”.
37. E.g. J. Getzler, supra, note 21, p. 67 : “These Justinianic and Bractonian formulations 
are perhaps the key texts in the long history of water rights ; they are cited continually in 
judgments and treatises for the next 600 years.” Some authors cite the Magna Carta 1212, 
revised 1225, as another historical antecedent to the public trust : e.g. C.F. wilkinson, 
supra, note 34, 429 ; but see P. deveney, supra, note 29, 39-41.
38. J.S. stevens, supra, note 30, 199 (identifying Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 
Judicature, 1821), as first case in which American court “declared the law of public trust 
as we know it today”) ; see also C.F. wilkinson, supra, note 34, 450, at footnote 103.
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tion of Sax’s 1970 seminal article39, which inspired much academic debate 
and judicial consideration. 
The concept of a public trust has been invoked more tentatively in 
Canada. It was referred to in some early cases, notably R. v. Robertson40, 
an 1882 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in which Strong J. 
mentioned the existence of New York cases recognizing that the beds of 
large navigable inland waterways “are, by the common law, vested in the 
State as a trustee for the public, and are inalienable without legislative 
authority”, but said that this “important question” had not been raised for 
adjudication in Roberston41. Other Canadian cases mentioning a public trust 
include Green v. Ontario42, R. v. Mann43 and Walpole Island First Nation 
v. Canada44, and an established line of cases recognizes that municipalities 
hold title to streets in trust for the public45. As well, some pioneer writings 
explored the possibility of a public trust in Canada46. Then came the 2004 
39. Joseph L. sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law : Effective Judicial 
Intervention”, (1969-1970) 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 489 (identifying U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) 
as “Lodestar in American Public Trust Law”).
40. R. v. Roberston, (1882) 6 S.C.R. 52 (New Brunswick case deciding that ownership of 
ungranted beds of navigable rivers vested in provincial rather than federal Crown).
41. Id., 132 and 138 (see also Ritchie C.J. at page 126, concluding that since ungranted lands 
of province were “in the [provincial] crown for the benefit of the people”, so too was right 
to fish). Two earlier cases are R. v. Meyers (1852), 3 U.C.C.P. 305, par. 123 (major inland 
waterways “vested in the crown in trust for the public uses for which nature intended 
them”) and R. v. Lord (1864), 1 P.E.I. 245 (“the king is […] nothing more than a trustee 
of the public” with respect to public rights of navigation and fishing), cited in Kate P. 
sMallwood, Coming Out of Hibernation : The Canadian Public Trust Doctrine, LL.M. 
Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, 1993, p. 80, [Online], [circle.
ubc.ca/handle/2429/1465] (10 November 2010).
42. Green v. Ontario (1972), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 20 (Ont. H.C.J.) (extractive activities outside 
public park ; existence of public trust denied).
43. R. v. Mann, 1990 CanLII 603 (BC S.C.) (aboriginal priority in salmon fishery ; public 
trust held arguable). See also Mann v. Canada, 1991 CanLII 1962 (BC S.C.).
44. Walpole Island First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 3 C.N.L.R. 351 (Ont. 
S.C.) (aboriginal title to bed of lake ; public trust held arguable).
45. E.g. S.W.Properties Inc. v. Calgary (City), 2003 ABCA 10, par. 19, 222 D.L.R. (4th) 430. 
On the dedication of roads and other public spaces, see Andrew GaGe, “Highways, Parks 
and the Public Trust Doctrine”, (2007) 18 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 1.
46. E.g. : Constance D. Hunt, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Canada”, in John swaiGen 
(ed.), Environmental Rights in Canada, Canadian Environmental Law Research 
 Foundation, Toronto, Butterworths, 1981, p. 151 ; K.P. sMallwood, supra, note 41 ; 
John C. MaGuire, “Fashioning an Equitable Vision for Public Resource Protection and 
Development in Canada : The Public Trust Doctrine Revisited and Reconceptualized”, 
(1997) 7 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 1 ; Barbara von tiGerstroM, “The Public Trust Doctrine 
in Canada”, (1997) 7 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 379.
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decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Forest Products47, 
an action by British Columbia for damages for the loss of trees on Crown 
land resulting from a forest fire caused by the defendant’s negligence. Both 
the majority and the minority of the Court accepted the right of the Crown, 
in appropriate cases, to sue as parens patriae in damages for harm to the 
environment. Binnie J., speaking for the majority, supported this conclu-
sion with references to Justinian and Bracton and to the American public 
trust48. Although these remarks are obiter (as the majority felt this was not 
an appropriate case in which to sanction environmental loss as the issue 
had not been fully argued in the courts below), Canadian Forest Products, 
like Sax’s article, has been a catalyst for a more sustained Canadian interest 
in the public trust. It has been widely commented upon49 and quoted with 
approval in several cases, notably by the trial judge in Prince Edward 
Island v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans)50.
The nature of an American-style public trust is not clear. At first blush 
it appears to be a property-based institution51, and the evocative word 
47. British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., supra, note 25.
48. Id., par. 71-80.
49. See specifically : Jerry V. deMarCo, Marcia valiente and Marie-Ann Bowden, 
“Opening the Door for Common Law Environmental Protection in Canada : The Deci-
sion in British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd.”, (2005) 15 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 
233 ; Stewart A.G. elGie and Anastasia M. lintner, “The Supreme Court’s Canfor 
Decision : Losing the Battle but Winning the War for Environmental Damages”, (2005) 
38 U.B.C. L. Rev. 223. See more generally : Jerry V. deMarCo, “The Supreme Court 
of Canada’s Recognition of Fundamental Environmental Values : What Could be Next 
in Canadian Environmental Law ?”, (2007) 17 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 159 ; S. kidd, supra, 
note 30. See also on parens patriae : William R. MaCkay, “Parens Patriae as a Basis 
for Provincial Standing in Judicial Review of Federal Decisions”, (2007-2008) 45 Alta. L. 
Rev. 961 ; Craig E. Jones, “The Attorney General’s Standing to Seek Relief in the Public 
Interest : The Evolving Doctrine of Parens Patriae”, (2007) 86 Can. Bar. Rev. 121.
50. Prince Edward Island v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2005 PESCTD 
57, 256 Nfld. & P.E.I. Rep. 343, rev’d 2006 PESCAD 27, 277 D.L.R. (4th) 735 (leave to 
appeal refused, S.C.C., 28-06-2007, 31887, [2007] S.C.R. vii) (motion to strike statement 
of claim in action challenging management of Atlantic fisheries denied ; reversed on 
procedural grounds). In denying the motion, the trial judge quoted with approval both 
British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., supra, note 25, and Major J. in 
Comeau’s Sea Foods Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
12, par. 37 : “Canada’s fisheries are a ‘common property resource’, belonging to all the 
people of Canada […] it is the Minister’s duty to manage, conserve and develop the 
fishery on behalf of Canadians in the public interest.”
51. E.g. Harrison C. dunninG, “The Public Trust : A Fundamental Doctrine of American 
Property Law”, (1988-1989) 19 Envtl. L. 515. Occasionally, however, the concept seems 
to be used more widely, to encompass the general trust and confidence the governed 
must have in their government and its public officials. See the discussion infra, section 
2.3. Even J.L. sax, supra, note 39, 484, speaks of “the rather dubious notion that the 
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“trust” implies the existence of twinned proprietary interests, one belonging 
to the State and the other to the public : the State’s interest consists of the 
management obligation (or burden) and the public’s interest represents 
the benefit52. However, this suggests a need to look more closely at the 
historical development of the public trust, to see to what extent it supports 
the concept of twinned proprietary interests implicit in a trust. A closer 
look is necessary because, as one author put it, “a great deal of Roman and 
medieval law and history lurks there [i.e. in the public trust doctrine] […] 
and not always in a form recognizable to one interested in ‘pure’ scholarly 
history. The courts have developed and erratically applied what is really 
a counter-history, a purely judicial history of the public’s interest in the 
coastal area53.”
Five areas need particular attention. One is the distinction between 
res communes (common things) and res publicae (public things), a distinc-
tion made by Justinian54 but one which has become blurred in the modern 
discussion of the public trust. A second area needing attention is the basic 
distinction between property belonging to the sovereign in a personal 
capacity (the privy purse) and property belonging to the sovereign as head 
of state (the public purse), a distinction that came slowly to Roman law 
general public should be viewed as a property holder” and seems to regard the trust as 
providing for strengthened judicial review. See also M.C. BluMM, supra, note 32, 589 
ff. : “Public Trust as ‘Hard Look’ Doctrine”.
52. E.g. Erin ryan, “Public Trust and Distrust : The Theoretical Implications of the Public 
Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management”, (2001) 31 Envtl. L. 477, 487 : “The 
public trust, after all, remains a ‘trust’ − in which a bundle of specifically designated 
private property rights are assigned to the ‘public’ and delegated to the oversight of the 
sovereign as trustee.” Eileen E. Gillese and Martha MilCzynski, The Law of Trusts, 
2nd ed., Toronto, Irwin Law, 2005, p. 17, describe the trust relationship as one of “split-
title ownership”. A trust is not the only possible proprietary relationship, however, and 
the public’s interests in navigation and fishing in the public trust example of Crown 
ownership of the beds of navigable rivers and the foreshore are sometimes classified 
as easements or profits à prendre. These are long-recognized, albeit limited, proprietary 
interests in another’s property, and their title relationship does not reflect the symme-
trical twinned ownership typical of a trust. Rather, the interests of each are separate 
and asymmetrical, with the owner of the burdened property having a larger “corporeal” 
interest and the owner of the easement or profit having a more limited “incorporeal” 
right.
53. P. deveney, supra, note 29, 15.
54. The Institutes of Justinian, translated by Thomas Collett sandars, Chicago, Callaghan 
& Company, 1876, p. 603, Book 2 “Law Relating to Things”. Res publicae belong to the 
State and are said to include “rivers and ports, and the right of fishing therein, and the 
use for purposes of navigation of the banks thereof, although these banks might belong 
to private proprietors”. Both res communes and res publicae fall under the category of 
“res extra nostrum patrimonium”.
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and very late to the common law55. Patrick Deveney calls an acceptance 
of this distinction “the basis for any real public trust56”. A third is the 
distinction between (public) property held in full ownership and property 
held on trust. This distinction did not exist in Roman law and evolved only 
gradually over the 13th to 16th centuries in England57, later than the period 
in which the public trust is usually said to have originated. A fourth area 
for study is the distinction between alienable and inalienable public prop-
erty. Inalienability is not a necessary component of a trust, and trustees 
often have a power of sale over the individual assets in a trust, but some 
authors stress the inalienable nature of property subject to a public trust58. 
However, English and Canadian common law clearly accepts that the beds 
of navigable waters (the prototypical public trust asset) can be alienated by 
the Crown, and that this usually results in the right to fish being privatized 
but the right of navigation remaining public59. A final area needing attention 
is the distinction between public property and public rights. What is the 
nature of the trust asset being held on behalf of the public ? Is it property, or 
is it rights ? Of course, the two concepts, are interrelated, even interchange-
able, in the sense that some rights, such as a right of navigation, might in 
some circumstances also be a proprietary interest (i.e. an easement), but 
might in other circumstance be something less (i.e. a mere license or permis-
sion). However, the various discussions of the public trust do not seem to 
distinguish particularly between these two concepts, and a closer analysis 
of the nature of the trust asset might be helpful.
In sum, one American author describes the public trust as a “legal 
fiction60”, one which has outgrown its initial usefulness as it has been 
55. P. deveney, supra, note 29, 17 and 50 (distinction not made in England until 1800s). See 
also J. Walter Jones, “The Early History of the Fiscus”, (1927) 43 Law Q. Rev. 499.
56. P. deveney, supra, note 29, 17.
57. Mark R. Gillen and Faye woodMan (eds.), The Law of Trusts. A Contextual Approach, 
2nd ed., Toronto, Emond Montgomery Publications, 2008, p. 43-48.
58. Many quote the Court in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. State of Illinois, supra, 
note 39, 453 : “The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
people are interested, like navigable waters and the soil under them […] than it can 
abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of 
the peace.” E.g. : R.J. lazarus, supra, note 19, 638, at footnote 33 ; J.S. stevens, supra, 
note 30, 212 ; C.F. wilkinson, supra, note 34, 452 and 453.
59. E.g. E.H. Burn and J. CartwriGHt, supra, note 21, p. 177-179. For an exploration of the 
source of this rule, see e.g. F.R. Coudert, supra, note 29.
60. R.J. lazarus, supra, note 19, 656 : “Assessment of the future value of the public trust 
doctrine must start with the candid premise that the doctrine rests on legal fictions. 
Notions of ‘sovereign ownership’ of certain natural resources and the ‘duties of the sove-
reign as trustee’ to natural resources are simply judicially created shorthand methods to 
justify treating differently governmental transactions that involve those resources.”
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replaced by developments in other areas of the law61. But the “public trust” 
is a concept that resonates strongly. As another author puts it, in relation 
to water :
The public trust, as it is applied to the appropriation of water, is based on a set of 
modest beliefs : a belief that the public benefits mightily from private development, 
but that the public interest is in fact greater than the sum of the private interests ; 
a belief that property ownership must be profoundly respected but that property 
rights in water, like rights in land, are not absolute but rather can be regulated 
and adjusted in reasonable ways for the good of the citizenry as a whole ; a belief 
that wasteful uses of public resources are wrong and are not excused by return 
flows that return to our rivers not just water but also silt, salts, agrichemicals, 
and temperature changes ; a belief that our rivers and canyons are more than 
commodities, that they have a trace of the sacred ; a belief that words like “trust” 
ought to be taken seriously62.
Perhaps, therefore, Canadian courts should simply adopt, or adapt, the 
public trust as a sui generis concept developed by the courts of a sister 
jurisdiction, without looking too closely at its historical origins63. Or they 
might consider whether classical Canadian trust and fiduciary law provides 
a similar sort of protection64.
2.2 Classical trusts
Modern Canadian trust law recognizes two types of trusts65. One is 
a trust for persons and the other, a trust for purposes. Each is subject to 
the same basic requirements : a substantive requirement that the content 
of the trust respect the “three certainties”, and a procedural requirement 
that the trust be properly constituted. These requirements are interrelated.
2.2.1 Certainty
The substantive “three certainties” are certainty of intention, subject 
matter and objects, and their application to ownership of water in situ 
61. Id., 656 ff. (discussing developments relating to standing, torts, administrative law and 
police power – i.e. regulation). Critics fault Lazarus as being “hopelessly naive” in this 
regard : M.C. BluMM, supra, note 32, 593, at footnote 98.
62. C.F. wilkinson, supra, note 34, 471 and 472.
63. “This ‘public trust’ is a sui generis concept that does not invoke traditional trust law. The 
concept of a common law pubic trust has yet to develop in Canada but it may also not 
yet be foreclosed” : Donovan W. waters, Mark R. Gillen and Lionel D. sMitH (eds.), 
Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 3rd ed., Toronto, Thomson/Carswell, 2005, p. 31.
64. See e.g. K.P. sMallwood, supra, note 41, p. 101 ff. ; see also C.D. Hunt, supra, note 46, 
at pages 174 ff.
65. The discussion of classical trust law relies particularly on : M.R. Gillen and F. woodMan 
(eds.), supra, note 57 ; D.W. waters, M.R. Gillen and L.D. sMitH, supra, note 63 ; E.E. 
Gillese and M. MilCzynski, supra, note 52.
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is not without difficulty. The first two certainties, intention and subject 
matter, apply in much the same way to trusts for persons or purposes. The 
first certainty, that of “certainty of intention”, requires that the persons 
setting up the trust (the settlors) clearly intend that the persons holding the 
property hold it for the benefit of the persons or purposes indicated, and 
not simply for their own benefit. This requirement is interrelated with the 
basic procedural requirement that a trust be properly constituted, discussed 
below66.
The second certainty, that of “certainty of subject matter”, in principle 
ought not to cause much difficulty in regard to water in situ. It has two 
aspects, a collective certainty as to the property subject to the trust and 
an individual certainty as to the amount each beneficiary is to receive. The 
first aspect requires that the property be described in such a way that it is 
ascertained or ascertainable. If the property is the surface and underground 
water located in a province, it is presumably something that is either ascer-
tained or capable of ascertainment by qualified hydrologists. However, 
there is some ambiguity in the public trust literature about the nature of the 
asset held on trust, as noted above67. Is it the property itself, or is it a more 
limited right over the property such as an easement ? Although classical 
trust law recognizes that any sort of property — including intangible prop-
erty such as rights — can be held in trust, the requirement of certainty of 
subject matter reinforces the need, identified above, for more clarity about 
this issue. As for the second aspect, that of certainty of each beneficiary’s 
share, this can be satisfied either by having a method by which shares to 
water are to be determined (e.g. the common law property-based rules for 
access to water68), or by giving the trustee discretion to decide the share 
(e.g. statutory water withdrawal standards), or under a basic fall-back 
presumption of equality.
The third certainty, that of “certainty of objects”, requires that the 
beneficiaries of the trust be defined with enough certainty that the trustees 
are able to administer the trust and the courts to enforce it. This is seen 
as an important stumbling block to the application of classical trust law to 
the public trust situation69. Trust objects may be either persons or, more 
66. Infra the discussion at section 2.2.2.
67. Supra the discussion following note 59.
68. Supra the discussion following note 22. These rules might be certain enough to meet 
the requirements of trust law, without necessarily being fair or equitable in given 
circumstances.
69. E.g. C.D. Hunt, supra, note 46, at pages 174 ff., discussing Green v. Ontario, supra, 
note 42.
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occasionally, purposes, and the certainty of objects requirement is applied 
differently to each.
2.2.1.1 Trusts for persons 
Most classical trusts are trusts for persons, and this initially appears to 
be the case for trusts of water in situ as the trusts are diversely described as 
being for the benefit of “all”, “the people”, “the public”, or another similar 
term70. The test for certainty of objects for person trusts differs for fixed 
and discretionary trusts. A fixed trust is one in which the beneficial inter-
ests have been specified in the trust instrument, and the trustees have no 
discretion as to choice of beneficiary or amount of benefit. This means that 
to implement the trust, the trustees must be able to identify each and every 
beneficiary, and for this reason, the test of certainty of objects for fixed 
trusts is a “complete list” (or “class ascertainability”) test. However, where 
the trusts are discretionary — that is, where the trustees have discretion 
to choose which beneficiaries in a designated class will receive anything 
from the trust, how much each will receive, and when — the trustees do not 
have be able to identify all member of the class before choosing ; rather, 
they just have to ascertain that the chosen beneficiaries are members of 
the designated class. For this reason, the test for certainty of objects for 
discretionary trusts is a less-demanding “is or is not” (or “individual ascer-
tainability”) test71. 
A trust of water in situ probably has both fixed and discretionary 
elements. It would be fixed as to basic needs (health and sanitation), and 
it seems likely that the government has enough personal data (e.g. social 
insurance numbers, census data and so on) to satisfy the complete list 
test in a way to ensure widespread and equitable distribution of this vital 
resource. It would probably be regarded as discretionary in regard to addi-
tional uses (e.g. agricultural, manufacturing, industrial, etc.), where the 
government must establish priorities amongst classes of users, but then 
has only to consider whether a particular permit applicant “is or is not” a 
member of the class in question.
70. To cite examples from Justinian as quoted in : P. deveney, supra, note 29, 23, and 
Bracton as quoted in British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., supra, note 25, 
par. 75 ; Illinois Central Railroad Company v. State of Illinois, supra, note 39, as quoted 
in J.L. sax, supra, note 39, 489 and 490, and R. v. Robertson, supra, note 40, 126 ; 
E. ryan, supra, note 52, 487.
71. See McPhail v. Doulton, [1971] A.C. 424 (H.L.).
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2.2.1.2 Trusts for purposes 
Trusts of water in situ may perhaps be seen as trusts for purposes (e.g. 
the purpose of providing open and equitable access to water) rather than 
as trusts to benefit persons directly. In this case, different considerations 
about certainty of objects apply. Although purpose trusts are generally 
regarded as invalid because a purpose does not have standing to bring an 
action to enforce it, an important exception to this rule is made for trusts 
for public purposes (i.e. charitable trusts)72. The only required certainty is 
that the purpose be public (charitable) ; once this basic threshold is crossed, 
further specificity about the purpose is unnecessary73. The public nature 
of the purpose means that the Attorney General acting for the Crown as 
parens patriae has standing to enforce the trust, thus overcoming the prin-
ciple obstacle to the recognition of purpose trusts generally. 
A public, or charitable, purpose trust requires “an exclusive dedica-
tion of property to a charitable purpose in a way that provides a public 
benefit74”. The first question, therefore, is whether the purpose of the trust 
is charitable, and a long line of cases categorizes charitable purposes under 
the four heads of : relief of poverty, advancement of religion, advancement 
of education, and “other purposes beneficial to the community75”. The 
second question is whether there is the requisite public benefit, as proof of 
public benefit rather than private advantage is essential for a public purpose 
trust. Public benefit is presumed (although it can be rebutted) in regard 
to the first three charitable areas – religion, education and poverty — but 
must be proved in regard to the residual fourth category, “other purposes 
beneficial to the community”. This is done both by arguing by analogy from 
recognized cases and by demonstrating a “benefit of the community or of 
an appreciably important class of the community”. The third question is 
whether the trust assets are dedicated exclusively to a charitable purpose.
72. Private purpose trusts (i.e. non-charitable trusts), on the other hand, are caught by the 
general rule and thus void, although the courts sometimes struggle to find a way around 
this result in particular cases.
73. The courts have inherent jurisdiction to supply a “scheme” to provide any additional 
necessary specificity.
74. M.R. Gillen and F. woodMan (eds.), supra, note 57, p. 231.
75. The choice of these four heads of charity is encrusted with history. It follows a classifica-
tion set out by Lord Macnaughton in Special Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel, 
[1891] A.C. 531, 583 (H.L.), which was itself based on the preamble to the Statute of 
Charitable Uses Act, 1601 (UK), 43 Eliz., c. 4. On the continued use of this approach in 
Canada, see Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. Canada 
(Minister of National Revenue), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 10.
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Open and equitable access to water in situ would seem to be a 
particularly compelling example of a purpose “beneficial to the commu-
nity”. Access to water is more than beneficial : it is necessary, not just 
for humans but also for all living things. A purpose trust suggests taking 
a more ecocentric approach to water needs, not just an anthropocentric 
one as might be implied by a persons trust. And the exclusive dedication 
requirement stresses that all water must be dedicated to the public purpose, 
so that commercialization of any part of it — and the private advantage 
this entails — would not be permitted. However, parens patriae enforce-
ment raises practical difficulties in the context, as the Crown would be 
both plaintiff and defendant ; public interest intervention might provide a 
partial solution76.
2.2.2 Constitution
The second basic requirement for a valid trust is the procedural 
requirement that the trust be properly constituted. Mere intention to create 
a trust is not enough ; title to trust property must be vested in the trustee 
to be held in trust for the designated objects (persons or purposes). How 
is a trust of water in situ set up, or constituted ? Most trusts are consti-
tuted by the transfer of the asset from a settlor to a trustee, although they 
can also be created by declaration of trust or by operation of law. The 
first method, a transfer from settlor to trustee, is difficult to envisage for 
water in situ : if the Crown is the trustee, who is the settlor ? A declara-
tion of trust by the Crown that it holds the water on trust seems more 
possible. For example, the statutory declarations of Crown ownership 
of water in situ in the western provinces could be read as declarations of 
trust, and the question would be whether the statutory provisions (and 
perhaps surrounding documentation) are sufficiently explicit in this regard 
to satisfy the certainty of intention requirement77. However, this implies 
that without a sufficiently clear declaration of trust, Crown ownership is 
76. This subject is too large to canvass properly here. See e.g. Michelle CaMpBell, “Re-inven-
ting Intervention in the Public Interest : Breaking Down Barriers to Access” (2005) 15 
J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 187
77. E.g. BritisH ColuMBia, Ministry oF environMent, Information Sheet : Water Rights 
in British Columbia, 26 June 2006, [Online], [ww.env.gov.bc.ca/wsd/water_rights/cabinet/
water_rights_in_bc.pdf] (12 November 2010) opens with a statement that the B.C. Water 
Act, supra, note 13, “assigns ownership of surface and ground water to the Crown, on 
behalf of the residents of the province” [emphasis added]. “On behalf of” is a classic 
phrase to signal a trust, but the ownership section of the Act itself (id., s. 2) does not 
contain any words suggesting a trust relationship. Moreover, D.W. waters, M.R. Gillen 
and L.D. sMitH, supra, note 63, p. 30, caution that words alone do not create a trust, and 
that the Crown’s intention to become a “true trustee” must be clear from the context.
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absolute, which we have suggested is an untenable conclusion. The second 
possible method for constituting a trust to water in situ, that of operation 
of law, seems inherently satisfying in light of the historical references to 
natural law and the jus gentium78, but how would classical Canadian trust 
law treat this method ? 
The most important type of trust arising by law is the “constructive 
trust”, and common law Canada recognizes two sorts : an “institutional” 
constructive trust (as in England) and a “remedial” constructive trust (as 
in the United States). The latter has attracted much attention in Canada 
as a remedy for unjust enrichment, with the Supreme Court of Canada 
playing a leading role in its development. Unjust enrichment is said to 
lie “at the heart of the constructive trust”, and to have as its constituent 
elements “an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation and absence of any 
juristic reason for the enrichment79”. The Supreme Court is said to take a 
“straightforward economic approach80” to the first two requirements, and 
to see enrichment as a tangible benefit conferred on the defendant by the 
plaintiff and detriment as comprising lost opportunity81. The third require-
ment — absence of juristic reason for the enrichment — is the most difficult 
to assess. It is at this stage that the courts consider the fairness or just-
ness of the enrichment, which the Supreme Court has recently suggested 
involves assessing two factors, “the reasonable expectations of the parties 
and public policy considerations82”. These requirements appear especially 
applicable to situations in which the State seeks to profit from its owner-
ship of water in situ (by selling it in bulk, for example, or by permitting 
extensive use of it in resource extraction activities which generate royalties 
for the State). The State’s coffers are enriched (although it is difficult to 
envisage this benefit as flowing from the public to the State) ; the public’s 
supply of water is diminished or polluted ; and there does not appear to be 
any juristic reason, any legal justification, for this enrichment, as it neither 
reflects the reasonable expectations of the parties (since Crown ownership 
is merely intended to buttress the regulatory mechanisms) nor accords with 
public policy expectations (as commercialization of water in this way risks 
depriving the public and the environment of this vital resource).
78. E.g. supra, the text at note 26.
79. Becker v. Pettkus, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, par. 37 and 38 (Dickson J., describing this approach 
as “supported by general principles of equity that have been fashioned by the courts for 
centuries”).
80. Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, par. 8 (McLachlin J.).
81. Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 762, 790 (McLachlin J.).
82. Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629, par. 46 (Iacobucci J.). For a critique 
of this approach, see Mitchell MCinnis, “Making Sense of Juristic Reason : Unjust 
Enrichment After Garland v. Consumers’ Gas”, (2004-2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 399.
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The institutional constructive trust, on the other hand, has been largely 
ignored in Canada for several decades, but its continued importance was 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1997 :
The appeal thus presents two different views of the function and ambit of the 
constructive trust. One view sees the constructive trust exclusively as a remedy 
for clearly established loss. On this view, a constructive trust can arise only where 
there has been “enrichment” of the defendant and corresponding “deprivation” 
of the plaintiff. The other view, while not denying that the constructive trust 
may appropriately apply to prevent unjust enrichment, does not confine it to that 
role. On this view, the constructive trust may apply absent an established loss to 
condemn a wrongful act and maintain the integrity of the relationships of trust 
which underlie many of our industries and institutions.
It is my view that the second, broader approach to constructive trust should 
prevail. This approach best accords with the history of the doctrine of the 
constructive trust […] and the purposes which the constructive trust serves in 
our legal system83.
The idea of a constructive trust arising by operation of law to “maintain the 
integrity of the relationship of trust” underlying the public’s acceptance of 
government management of water in situ and the possibility this gives the 
public to “condemn a wrongful act” in this management comes close to the 
American notion of a public trust and the Québec idea of custodianship. 
Moreover, the case for the imposition of an institutional constructive trust 
is strongest when there has been a breach of fiduciary duties, and several 
Canadian authors have emphasized the fiduciary role of the Crown when 
writing of the public trust84.
2.3 Fiduciary duties 
There has been an explosion of case law and academic commentary 
about fiduciaries and fiduciary duties in common law Canada over the last 
twenty-five years, and it is difficult to come up with a succinct description 
of what a fiduciary relationship is and the fiduciary duties arising from 
it85. At the risk of over-simplification, a fiduciary duty is a duty of loyalty 
owed by one to another, a duty to act solely in the other’s interest and not 
in one’s own interest. The strength and importance of such a duty was 
83. Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, par. 14 and 15 (McLachlin J., speaking for 
the Court) [emphasis added].
84. E.g. K.P. sMallwood, supra, note 41, p. 119 ff. ; J.C. MaGuire, supra, note 46, 25 ff.
85. One judge spoke, with apparent frustration, of the word “fiduciary” being “flung around” : 
Southin J. in Girardet v. Crease & Co., (1987) 11 B.C.L.R. (2d) 361, 362 (B.C.S.C.), as 
quoted in Leonard I. rotMan, “Fiduciary Doctrine : A Concept in Need of Understan-
ding”, (1995-1996) 34 Alta. L. Rev. 821, 823.
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emphasized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin v. R., which deals 
with the obligations of the Crown in regard to Indian lands and held that :
the nature of Indian title and the framework of the statutory scheme for [its dispo-
sition placed] upon the Crown an equitable obligation, enforceable by the courts, 
to deal with the land for the benefit of the Indians […] This obligation does not 
amount to a trust in the private law sense. It is rather a fiduciary duty. If, however, 
the Crown breaches this fiduciary duty it will be liable to the Indians in the same 
way and to the same extent as if such a trust were in effect86.
The Supreme Court describes fiduciary relationships as possessing 
three general characteristics : 
1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.
2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect 
the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.
3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary 
holding the discretion or power87.
These indicia capture well the situation of Crown ownership of water in 
situ : the Crown has a good deal of discretionary power over access to 
water ; the manner in which this power is exercised certainly affects people ; 
and the people are in a peculiarly vulnerable position, given the necessity 
of water to them. These indicia are regularly cited with approval, but they 
are very wide and could apply to many, if not most, government activities.
The extent to which governments can be held subject to fiduciary 
duties was raised by the Supreme Court in Guerin. Although it expressed 
caution about imposing fiduciary duties on the Crown, the Court never-
theless accepted the possibility of doing so in appropriate circumstances :
It should be noted that fiduciary duties generally arise only with regard to obliga-
tions originating in a private law context. Public law duties, the performance of 
which requires the exercise of discretion, do not typically give rise to a fiduciary 
relationship. As the “political trust” cases indicate, the Crown is not normally 
viewed as a fiduciary in the exercise of its legislative or administrative function. 
The mere fact, however, that it is the Crown which is obligated to act on the 
86. Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, par. 79 (Dickson J.) [emphasis added].
87. Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, par. 60 (Wilson J., in dissent), cited with approval in 
e.g. International Corona Resources Ltd. v. LAC Minerals Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 646. 
See also Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 409 (distinguishing between per se 
and ad hoc fiduciary relationships : that is, situations where fiduciary duties are “innate 
to a given relationship” (i.e. relationships that have “as their essence discretion, influence 
over interests, and an inherent vulnerability” [emphasis in original]) and those in which 
fiduciary obligations “arise as a matter of fact out of the specific circumstances of that 
particular relationship”). For a recent discussion of “the developing jurisprudence” on 
fiduciary duties, see Perez v. Galambos, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247.
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Indians’ behalf does not of itself remove the Crown’s obligation from the scope 
of the fiduciary principle88.
But what is a “political trust” ? Here the word “trust” is not used in the 
proprietary sense of the twinned ownership institution recognized by equity 
but rather in the broader, generic sense of faith, confidence, reliance. In 
England, it is said to describe “the responsibility, the end, of government 
itself” and as such, to be “a political metaphor” : it is not an enforceable 
trust but rather only a “moral” one89. English courts are therefore reticent 
to recognize the Crown as being subject to fiduciary duties in the exercise of 
its governance obligations, and the reason for this is said to be the constitu-
tional imperative of parliamentary sovereignty. However, Commonwealth 
scholars argue that different imperatives apply in countries such as Canada 
and Australia and that courts here should be more willing to hold the Crown 
subject to fiduciary duties90.
The Crown’s fiduciary obligation in regard to aboriginal rights is firmly 
established in Canada, and there are now signs that the courts are willing 
to recognize that fiduciary obligations apply more widely. For example, 
in Canadian Forest Products, the Supreme Court raised the possibility of 
“enforceable fiduciary duties owed to the public by the Crown” in regard 
to the environment91. In Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General), a class 
action on behalf of disabled veterans, both the Superior Court and the 
Court of Appeal of Ontario held that the Crown was acting as a fiduciary 
in its administration of pensions on their behalf and had breached its duty 
88. Guerin v. R., supra, note 86, par. 100 (Dickson J.) [emphasis added].
89. Paul Finn, “The Forgotten ‘Trust’ : The People and the State”, in Malcolm Cope (ed.), 
Equity. Issues and Trends, Sydney, Federation Press, 1995, p. 131, at page 134, citing 
The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, by Herbert A.L. FisHer (ed.), 
vol. 3, Cambridge, University Press, 1911, p. 403. “Political” or “moral” trusts are also 
sometimes referred to as trust “in the higher sense”, as opposed to enforceable trusts “in 
the lower sense”, terms which Dickson J. criticized in Guerin v. R., supra, note 86, 375.
90. E.g. Brian slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution : A Question of Trust”, (1992) 
71 Can. Bar Rev. 261 ; P. Finn, supra, note 89 ; Lorne sossin, “Public Fiduciary Obli-
gations, Political Trusts, and the Equitable Duty of Reasonableness in Administrative 
Law”, (2003) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 129. See also Evan Fox-deCent, “The Fiduciary Nature 
of State Legal Authority”, (2005-2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 259 (grounding State’s fiduciary 
obligations in Kant’s generally applicable theory of right, rather than locally applicable 
constitutional imperatives).
91. British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., supra, note 25, par. 81. The state-
ment actually refers, somewhat ambiguously, to fiduciary duties owed “in that regard”. 
Grammatically, this probably refers back to the immediately preceding mention of the 
Crown’s potential liability for “inactivity in the face of threats to the environment”, but 
it is doubtful that the Court meant to suggest by this that the Crown would be liable for 
acts of nonfeasance but not of misfeasance.
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to them by failing to invest the funds or pay interest ; this finding was 
accepted by the Crown before the Supreme Court of Canada, which ruled 
against the veterans on other grounds92. And in Elder Advocates of Alberta 
Society v. Alberta, a class action on behalf of residents of long term care 
facilities, the Alberta Court of Appeal accepted as arguable that the Crown 
was acting as a fiduciary to the residents and had breached its duty to them 
by the way in which it set their accommodation charge93. On the other hand, 
in Harris v. Canada., a class action on behalf of Canadian taxpayers, the 
Trial Division of the Federal Court held that the Crown was not acting in 
a fiduciary capacity towards taxpayers when issuing advance tax rulings 
favouring particular taxpayers (although both the Trial Division and the 
Federal Court of Appeal had earlier held this to be arguable in proceedings 
to have the pleadings struck for failure to disclose a cause of action)94. In 
so ruling, the Court stressed that fiduciary relationships are unlikely to 
exist “where that would place the Crown in a conflict between its respon-
sibility to act in the public interest and the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to its 
beneficiary95”. This approach has been applied in a number of cases since 
92. Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 53 O.R. 
(3d) 221 (Ont. S.C.), aff’d (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.), rev’d in part [2003] 2 S.C.R. 
40 (class action ; decision on merits). The 1990 legislation which required the Crown to 
pay interest on the moneys excused the Crown from responsibility for interest accruing 
earlier, and the sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether this provision was 
inoperative under the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 
1985, App. III. There are a number of interrelated proceedings in Authorson : see e.g. 
Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ONCA 501, 
86 O.R. (3d) 321 for a résumé. Authorson was applied in Stopford v. Canada, [2004] 
1 F.C.R. 431 (F.C.T.D.), to find the Crown in breach of fiduciary to a disabled veteran, 
not for financial mismanagement as in Authorson but for failure to provide adequate 
moral and physical support on his return from Croatia.
93. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta, 2009 ABCA 403, rev’g in part 2008 ABQB 
490, [2008] 11 W.W.R. (leave to appeal granted, S.C.C., 20-05-2010, 33551, 2010 CanLII 
27723) (application for certification of class action). Note that in Western Bank v. Alberta, 
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, par. 88, the Supreme Court clarified that “refusal of leave should not 
be taken to indicate agreement with the judgment sought to be appealed, from any more 
than the grant of leave can be taken to indicate disagreement. In the leave process, the 
Court does not hear or adjudicate a case on the merits.”
94. Harris v. Canada, [2002] 2 F.C. 484 (F.C.T.D.) (decision on merits) ; [1999] 2 F.C. 392 
(F.C.T.D.), aff’d [2000] 4 F.C. 37 (F.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused, S.C.C., 26-10-2000, 
28041) (motion to strike) (plaintiff’s argument was that excusing privileged case of 
taxpayers increased tax burden of all others, or led to decreased government services).
95. Harris v. Canada (F.C.T.D., 2002), supra, note 94, par. 178.
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Harris96, and it clearly restricts the type of situations in which a fiduciary 
duty will be found. 
These cases suggest that the argument that the Crown is subject to 
fiduciary duties in regard to water in situ is not easy. One of the factors 
setting this situation apart from the exercise of most government regulatory 
functions is the Crown’s assumption of ownership of the water. Robert 
Flannigan’s explanation of the fiduciary relationship stresses the impor-
tance of access to property in deciding whether a fiduciary relationship 
exists. He states that the conventional function of fiduciary responsibility 
is to control “opportunism” (i.e. acting on one’s own behalf, not on behalf 
of the other) in “limited access arrangements” (i.e. access that is limited by 
an obligation to act on the other’s behalf) :
The physical arrangement that attracts fiduciary regulation is limited access or, in 
traditional terms, the undertaking to act wholly or partly in the interest of another. 
Those who are trusted for some defined purpose invariably acquire access to the 
assets (and opportunities) of their beneficiaries. The mischief associated with that 
access is that the value of the assets will be diverted or exploited for self-interested 
ends […] Where there is no access, on the other hand, there can be no opportu-
nistic diversion. Similarly, if the access is open, rather than limited, consumption 
or exploitation does not amount to objectionable self-regard97.
Guerin is a good example of a limited access arrangement, as the 
Crown has access (i.e. formal title) to reserve lands, but this access is 
limited, as the lands are to be dealt with only in the interest of the band. So 
too is Authorson, as the Crown has access to the pension moneys deposited 
in the Consolidated Revenue Fund, but this access is limited to using the 
moneys for the benefit of the disabled veterans. And the Court of Appeal in 
Elder Advocates suggested that the Crown’s access to the accommodation 
96. E.g. : Mosquito v. Saskatchewan, 2005 SKCA 31, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 520, rev’g 2004 SKQB 
53, 245 Sask. R. 132 (sub nom Dustyhorn Estate v. Stickney) (motion to strike ; not 
arguable that Crown’s fiduciary duty to aboriginals extends to death of intoxicated 
person released from custody) ; Wuttunee v. Merck Frost Canada Ltd., 2007 SKQB 29 
(application to certify class action ; not arguable that Crown acting as fiduciary when 
licensing prescription drugs) ; Mainville v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 251 
(F.C.T.D.), 310 F.T.R. 100 (Crown not acting as fiduciary when assigning snow crab 
quotas) ; South Yukon Forest Corporation v. Canada, 2010 FC 495(F.C.T.D.) (Crown not 
under fiduciary duty to ensure saw mill sustainable supply of timber). Moreover, these 
cases often cite Guerin v. R., supra, note 86 (notably the quotation cited supra the text 
at note 88), restrictively rather than permissively, in support of a decision to deny rather 
than recognize the existence of a fiduciary duty. See also e.g. : Laroza v. Ontario (2005), 
257 D.L.R. (4th) 761 (Ont. Sup.Ct.) ; C.H.S. v. Alberta (Director of Child Welfare), 2008 
ABQB 513, [2008] 12 W.W.R. 432.
97. Robert FlanniGan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability”, (2004) 83 Can. Bar 
Rev. 35, 36 and 37 [emphasis added].
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charges paid by residents of long term care facilities might also be simi-
larly limited as the residents might retain an interest in any amounts paid 
in excess of the real costs of accommodation98. Applying this approach 
to water in situ, all provincial governments have “access” to the asset of 
water through their licensing powers, and this “access” is stronger when 
the licensing power is complemented by ownership rights. But in neither 
case is the access “open”, in the sense of being full and absolute, so that the 
government is therefore not entitled to exploit the water for self-interested 
ends (e.g. permitting the commercialization of water resources for purely 
budgetary reasons, particularly if this results in water being transferred 
out of an aquifer) or for the ends of a privileged minority (e.g. permitting 
the use of large quantities of water for the extraction of natural resources, 
such as bituminous tar or shale gas). 
Conclusion
This article has looked at the legal regime applicable to water in situ 
in the common law provinces of Canada, with a view to seeing whether 
there are functional equivalents to Québec’s long-standing private law 
principle of res communis and its recently adopted statutory notion of State 
“custodianship” over water in its natural state. The first conclusion is that 
there is no direct functional equivalent to the notion of res communis, as 
the common law rejects the notion of private ownership of water in situ 
(recognizing instead a simple right of access to riparian and surface owners 
of land) but accepts, almost by default, the principle of Crown ownership. 
This acceptance is reflected in the legislation of the arid western provinces 
but remains implicit in the humid eastern provinces.
However, the article’s working hypothesis has been that the funda-
mental importance of water to life necessarily means that this Crown 
ownership of water in situ, whether reflected in statute or not, cannot be 
full and absolute but rather must be limited, more in the nature of “custodi-
anship” than “ownership”. The role of equity is to attenuate the rigours of 
the common law in situations when conscience demands it, and the article 
has explored three equitable institutions — the public trust, the classical 
trust and fiduciary duties — to see to what extent they might be applicable 
to limit Crown ownership of water. The second conclusion is that in each 
case, the argument that Crown ownership of water is so limited is difficult, 
but not impossible, to make. The major problem with an American-style 
98. Guerin v. R., supra, note 86 ; Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada (Attorney 
General), supra, note 92 ; Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta, supra, note 93, 
par. 100.
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public trust is assessing its historical underpinnings, and a possible solu-
tion is simply to adopt the doctrine as a sui generis concept developed by 
a sister jurisdiction, without being unduly concerned about its earlier roots. 
The principal hurdle with a classical trust is not the question of certainty 
of objects, as was expected, but rather determining how the trust was 
constituted. The most probable answer is that the Crown’s ownership of 
water is impressed with a trust in favour of the public by operation of law, 
under a constructive trust of one sort or another. Finally, the main obstacle 
with fiduciary duties is determining whether the Crown’s duties in regard 
to water are fiduciary in nature, and enforceable by the courts as such, or 
merely “political”. Guerin recognizes that public law duties can give rise 
to fiduciary duties, but subsequent cases have interpreted this recognition 
restrictively. The law relating to fiduciary duties in general, and political 
trusts in particular, is evolving. The upcoming decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Elder Advocates thus bears watching.
3155_droit_vol_51#3-4_sept-dec10.indd   519 11-02-02   17:10
